Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication by Slobogin, Christopher
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 89 Issue 6 
2012 
Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to 
Refuse Anti-Psychotic Medication 
Christopher Slobogin 
Vanderbilt University Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law and Psychology Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Christopher Slobogin, Sell’s Conundrums: The Right of Incompetent Defendants to Refuse Anti-Psychotic 
Medication, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 1523 (2012). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11 
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1523 
SELL’S CONUNDRUMS: THE RIGHT OF 
INCOMPETENT DEFENDANTS TO REFUSE  
ANTI-PSYCHOTIC MEDICATION 
CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN

 
ABSTRACT 
 The Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Sell v. United States declared 
that situations in which the state is authorized to forcibly medicate a 
criminal defendant to restore competency to stand trial “may be rare.” 
Experience since Sell indicates that this prediction was wrong. In fact, 
wittingly or not, Sell created three exceptions to its holding (the 
dangerousness, treatment incompetency, and serious crime exceptions) 
that virtually swallow the right to refuse. Using the still-on-going case of 
Jared Loughner as an illustration, this essay explores the scope of these 
exceptions and the dispositions available in those rare circumstances when 
none of them is met. It concludes that Sell has created an unnecessarily 
complicated and often counter-productive legal regime that should be 
abandoned in favour of the regime that pre-existed it. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Sell v. United States,
1
 decided in 2003, the Supreme Court stated that 
instances in which criminal defendants could be forcibly medicated to 
restore their trial competency ―may be rare.‖2 That casual declaration sent 
forensic hospital staff members all over the country into a panic. Since the 
treatment of choice for restoring defendants who are mentally ill is 
medication,
3
 and since upwards of 75 percent of those found incompetent 
 
 
  Milton Underwood Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School. This Essay is a 
version of a talk given at the University of Southern California Law School on March 22, 2012. 
 1. 539 U.S. 166 (2003). 
 2. Id. at 180. 
 3. This, at least, is the view of the American Psychiatric Association. See Brief of American 
Psychiatric Association and American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law as Amici Curiae in Support 
of Neither Party and supporting Affirmance at 12, United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339, 2011 WL 
2694294 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011) (―Antipsychotic medications are an accepted and often irreplaceable 
treatment for acute psychotic illnesses, as most firmly established for schizophrenia, because the 
benefits of antipsychotic medications, compared to any other available means of treatment, outweigh 
their acknowledged side effects.‖). But see infra note 76. 
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to proceed refuse medication at one time or another,
4
 the Court’s language 
sounded like a death-knell for forensic treatment programs. It also raised 
the specter of thousands of criminal defendants, now alerted to the fact 
that a treatment refusal might prevent prosecution, either languishing in 
mental hospitals or obtaining outright release. 
But none of this has occurred. It is true that Sell has inspired trial courts 
to be much more careful in determining whether forcible medication of 
incompetent defendants may take place.
5
 And, as a result, medication 
hearings—most conspicuous among them those recently held in 
connection with the prosecution of Jared Lee Loughner, the accused 
shooter of Congresswoman Gabrielle Giffords and 20 others—have 
proliferated, especially at the federal level.
6
 But hidden or not so hidden 
within Sell were three exceptions to the general prohibition on involuntary 
medication—what this essay will call the dangerousness, treatment 
incompetency, and serious crime exceptions—that have enabled the 
restoration process to run almost as smoothly as it did pre-Sell, at least in 
the run-of-the-mill case. 
At the same time, Sell introduced a number of conundrums into the law 
of medication refusal and competency restoration. First, the scope of the 
aforementioned exceptions is very unclear. When is a person ―dangerous,‖ 
when is a person ―incompetent to make treatment decisions,‖ and when is 
a crime ―serious‖? Second, Sell left up in the air the disposition of the rare 
individual who has a right to refuse medication and, as a result, cannot be 
tried. Is that individual entitled to the protection of Jackson v. Indiana,
7
 
which held that an unrestorable person must be released or civilly 
committed, or does the fact that the person’s unrestorability is due to a 
refusal change the analysis? Third, the Supreme Court’s cases have yet to 
settle the extent to which courts, as opposed to some sort of administrative 
body, should be involved in all of these decisions.  
This essay fleshes out these issues and a number of related conundrums 
by looking at lower court cases and in particular the case of Jared 
Loughner. It concludes that the complicated legal edifice constructed by 
Sell is conceptually flawed and should be replaced by a simpler rule: 
 
 
 4. Robert D. Miller et al., The Impact of the Right to Refuse Treatment in a Forensic Patient 
Population: Six-Month Review, 17 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 107 (1989). 
 5. In this regard, however, Sell merely reinforced the Court’s earlier decision in Riggins v. 
Nevada, 504 U.S. 127 (1992), discussed further infra note 15. 
 6. See Michelle R. Cruz, Case Summary, United States v. Ruiz-Gaxiola: Setting the Standard 
for Medicating Defendants Involuntarily in the Ninth Circuit, 41 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 387, 398 
n.118 (2011) (listing circuit court of appeals decisions interpreting and applying Sell). 
 7. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11
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forcible medication of incompetent defendants charged with felonies 
should be permitted when the medication is a medically appropriate and 
essential method of restoring competency.  
II. SELL’S EXCEPTIONS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Sell was preceded ten years earlier by 
Riggins v. Nevada,
8
 which made clear that forcible medication in the 
pretrial setting must be ―medically appropriate,‖ as well as effective at and 
necessary to accomplishing the state’s treatment aims. Sell strongly 
reaffirmed this aspect of Riggins.
9
 As a result, lower courts determining 
whether a defendant may be forcibly medicated have devoted considerable 
energy to investigating the side effects of proposed medication, its 
capacity to alleviate psychotic symptomatology without undermining the 
capacity to assist counsel and confront witnesses, and whether it is the 
only way competency can be restored.
10
  
But Sell went well beyond endorsing Riggins’ appropriateness, 
efficacy, and necessity requirements. Even if those requirements are met, 
Sell strongly implied that a defendant found incompetent to stand trial will 
often be able to refuse medication. The decision emphasized that, given 
the invasive and possibly harmful effects of anti-psychotic drugs, forcible 
medication is permissible only when ―important‖ government interests are 
at stake.
11
 Thus, as noted above, the Court concluded that such medication 
―may be rare.‖ 
Read closely, however, Sell sowed the seeds of its demise. In the 
course of explicating its holding, the opinion explicitly or implicitly 
recognized three exceptions to the right to refuse that come close to 
emasculating the right. The exception most explicitly announced in Sell 
occurs when the defendant is dangerous to self or others. The second 
exception, only briefly alluded to in Sell, arises when the defendant is 
incompetent to make treatment decisions. The third exception, also less 
than forthrightly announced in Sell, exists when the defendant is charged 
 
 
 8. 504 U.S. 127 (1992). 
 9. See, e.g., Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179–81 (prohibiting involuntary medication of 
an accused for the purpose of restoring competency unless ―the treatment is medically appropriate, is 
substantially unlikely to have side effects that may undermine the fairness of the trial, and, taking 
account of less intrusive alternatives, is necessary significantly to further important governmental trial-
related interests‖) (citing Riggins, 504 U.S. at 134–38 and Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 225, 
227 (1990)).  
 10. See Cruz, supra note 6, at 399–401. 
 11. See Sell, 539 U.S. at 180. 
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with a serious crime. Each one of these exceptions raises tough 
definitional problems. But even interpreted narrowly, together they 
virtually eliminate any right to refuse beyond that which Riggins already 
provides. 
A. The Dangerousness Exception 
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion in Sell emphasized that, while 
forcible medication solely for the purpose of restoring competency might 
need to be significantly curtailed, ―alternative grounds‖ for medicating 
individuals over their objection still existed.
12
 This statement was followed 
by a citation to the Court’s decision in Washington v. Harper,13 which held 
that a prisoner may be forcibly medicated if the government can show the 
medication is a ―medically appropriate‖ way of treating ―serious mental 
illness‖ that has made the individual ―dangerous to himself or others.‖14 
Because Harper had dealt with a convicted individual rather than an 
individual merely charged with crime, its relevance to the competency 
restoration context was not entirely clear at the time it was decided. But 
two years later, Riggins held that Harper’s rule applied to persons who 
have been accused of crime as well as prisoners, albeit with two major 
caveats. First, the medication has to be ―essential‖ to protect the 
defendant’s safety or the safety of others in light of ―less intrusive 
alternatives.‖15 Second, if the state subsequently tries such a defendant it 
must also show that the medication does not affect his ability to 
comprehend criminal proceedings, interact with his attorney, or testify.
16
 
Riggins recognized that too much medication, even if necessary to reduce 
dangerousness or accomplish some other legitimate aim, can make a 
defendant incompetent to proceed and thus untriable. Ten years later Sell 
affirmed both of these caveats.
17
 
 
 
 12. Id. at 182. 
 13. 494 U.S. 210 (1990). 
 14. Id. at 226–27. 
 15. Id. at 135–36. As Sell would later describe Riggins, ―[t]he Court, citing Harper, noted that 
the State `would have satisfied due process if the prosecution had demonstrated . . . that treatment with 
antipsychotic medication was medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, 
essential for the sake of Riggins’ own safety or the safety of others.’‖ Sell, 539 U.S. at 179 (emphasis 
in original).  
 16. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 137 (trial judge’s failure to consider the effects of antipsychotic 
medication ―may well have impaired . . . constitutionally protected trial rights‖ because such effects 
could have ―had an impact upon not just Riggins’ outward appearance, but also the content of his 
testimony on direct or cross examination, his ability to follow the proceedings, or the substance of his 
communication with counsel.‖). 
 17. Sell, 539 U.S. at 181. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11
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The key issue in applying the dangerousness exception, of course, is 
the definition of dangerousness. A narrow definition, adopted in many 
state civil commitment statutes, would require a showing that, without 
intervention, there is a ―substantial likelihood‖ the individual will inflict 
―serious bodily harm‖ on himself or others ―in the near future.‖18 
Somewhat less demanding is the definition found in the prison policy 
implicitly upheld in Harper: a ―substantial risk‖ that failure to medicate 
will result either in physical harm to others or others’ property or in 
physical harm to self due to suicide, ―a failure to provide . . . essential 
human needs of health and safety,‖ or ―severe deterioration in routine 
functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or 
volitional control . . . .‖19 Broader still is Harper’s aforementioned 
summary of its holding, using the simple formulation ―dangerous to 
himself or others.‖20  
These standards vary in terms of: (1) likelihood of harm; (2) magnitude 
of harm; (3) imminence of harm; and (4) frequency of harm.
21
 Unless the 
definition of dangerousness is very tight—at the least requiring a 
significant and imminent risk of serious bodily harm—the government 
could often disguise an attempt to restore a defendant to competency as 
treatment to alleviate danger. After all, the defendant has recently been 
charged with a crime, has been found incompetent to proceed, and is likely 
to exhibit at least some conditions or behaviors—depression, violent 
outbursts—that suggest a threat to self or others. 
The proper definition of dangerousness is only the most obvious 
conundrum raised by this exception. Sell also followed Riggins in holding 
that involuntary medication under the dangerousness exception is 
impermissible if some other, ―less intrusive‖ means is available to limit 
the danger posed.
22
 The question then arises as to whether less potent 
medication, cognitive therapy, or some other treatment might work. A 
number of courts have even been willing to contemplate the argument that 
seclusion and restraint is a less ―intrusive‖ alternative to medication. For 
instance, in United States v. Weston,
23
 the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court of Appeals held, prior to Sell, that ―confinement—total seclusion 
 
 
 18. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 394.467(1)(a)(2)(b) (2012). 
 19. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 215 n.3 (1990). 
 20. Id. at 227. 
 21. See ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, Dangerousness Defined, in LAW, PSYCHIATRY & MENTAL 
HEALTH SYSTEMS 680 (Alexander Brooks ed., 1974). 
 22. See supra note 15. 
 23. 255 F.3d 873 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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and constant observation—obviated any significant danger [the defendant] 
might pose to himself or others.‖24  
Jared Loughner’s case illustrates many of the nuances associated with 
the dangerousness exception. On March 3, 2011 a federal grand jury 
indicted Loughner on multiple charges, including the murder of a federal 
judge (John M. Roll) and several other federal employees and the 
attempted assassination of a member of Congress (Gabrielle Giffords).
25
 
Loughner was sent to the Federal Medical Center in Springfield, Missouri, 
for an evaluation of his competency. On May 25, based on this evaluation, 
the district court in Tucson, Arizona, found him incompetent to stand 
trial.
26
 Upon return to Springfield in June, Loughner refused medication. 
During the next two weeks both an independent psychiatrist and the 
associate warden to whom Loughner appealed the psychiatrist’s decision 
concluded that anti-psychotic medication was in Loughner’s ―best medical 
interest‖ and necessary to prevent him from being ―dangerous to others.‖27  
Loughner appealed these administrative decisions to the Tucson federal 
district court. On June 29, that court refused to stop the treatment, in light 
of evidence that Loughner had become enraged at a psychiatrist, thrown a 
plastic chair at him, spat at his attorney, and thrown a wet roll of toilet 
paper at a camera.
28
 But three days later the defense team, led by Judy 
Clarke, an ex-public defender who has been involved in several high-
profile cases, asked the Ninth Circuit for an emergency stay, which was 
granted on July 12. Echoing Weston, a three-judge panel of the Ninth 
Circuit, headed by Judge Kozinski, found that Loughner’s interest in 
avoiding the possible side effects of the medication was more ―immediate‖ 
than the government interest in preventing harm to others, noting that the 
government ―has managed to keep Loughner in custody for over six 
months without injury to anyone.‖29  
That did not end the matter, however. A day after the oral arguments in 
front of the Ninth Circuit, Loughner was placed on suicide watch, and six 
 
 
 24. Id. at 878. Contrast this with Harper’s observation that restraints and seclusion may not be 
―acceptable substitutes for antipsychotic drugs, in terms of either their medical effectiveness or their 
toll on limited prison resources.‖ Harper, 494 U.S. at 226–27. 
 25. Response to Defendant’s Emergency Motion to Enforce Injunction and Compel Daily 
Production of BOP Records at 2–3, United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339D (9th Cir., July 22, 
2011), at 2–3 [hereinafter Response]. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. Id. at 4. 
 28. Tony Perry, Suspected Tucson Gunman Can Be Forced to Take Antipsychotic Drugs, Judge 
Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/30/nation/la-na-loughner-20110 
630. 
 29. United States v. Loughner, No. 11-339, 2011 WL 2694294, at *2 (9th Cir. July 12, 2011). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11
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days after the Ninth Circuit panel opinion was handed down the 
professionals at Springfield concluded that Loughner was ―an immediate 
threat to himself ‖ and thus still needed medication.30 The government 
alleged that he was observed screaming loudly and crying for hours at a 
time and, when asked whether he had thoughts of harming himself, stated, 
―I want to die. Give me the injection, kill me now.‖31 He was said to be 
disoriented and confused, limping because of his ―prolonged walking, 
pacing and standing,‖ and in a deteriorating physical condition because he 
did not eat many of his meals and sometimes stayed awake for over 
twenty-four hours at a time.
32
 The defense argued that Loughner’s primary 
symptoms were ―agitation and sleeplessness,‖ which could be addressed 
using minor tranquilizers,
33
 and also suggested that the government’s 
course of conduct indicated a ―willful violation‖ of the Ninth Circuit panel 
order.
34
 The government insisted that Loughner was a true threat to 
himself and that anti-psychotic medication was the only method of 
eradicating the cause of that threat.
35
 On July 22, the same Kozinski-led 
three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit denied Loughner’s request for a 
continued injunction against medication.
36
 In the ensuing months, 
Loughner continued to receive anti-psychotic drugs and, at the end of his 
first four-month commitment in September, the Ninth Circuit affirmed his 
commitment to the Federal Medical Center for an additional four 
months.
37
  
In early February 2012, Loughner’s commitment was extended for 
another four-month period.
38
 In the meantime, a series of challenges to 
these actions were consolidated and heard by another three-judge panel 
from the Ninth Circuit, which handed down a forty-five-page decision on 
March 5, 2012.
39
 Two judges, Bybee and Wallace, upheld the district 
 
 
 30. Response, supra note 25, at 11 (emphasis added). 
 31. Id. at 6. 
 32. Id.  
 33. Emergency Motion to Enforce Injunction and Compel Daily Production of BOP Records at 
7, United States v. Loughner, No. 11-10339 (9th Cir., July 22, 2011) [hereinafter Emergency Motion]. 
 34. Id. at 4. 
 35. Response, supra note 25, at 15 (―Loughner’s unmedicated behavior is endangering him, and 
. . . no measures short of medication will protect him from himself more than temporarily, because 
they do not address the mental state which underlies his self-destructive actions.‖).  
 36. United States v. Loughner, Order, No. 11-10339 (9th Cir., July 22, 2011). 
 37. Carol J. Williams, Loughner Loses Bid to Stay Out of Missouri Prison Hospital, LOS 
ANGELES TIMES, Oct. 7, 2011, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/nationnow/2011/10/loughner-can-return-
to-missouri-prison-hospital-appeals-court-rules.html. 
 38. United States v. Loughner, Nos. 11-10339, 11-10504, 11-10432, 2012 WL 688805, at *7 n.6 
(9th Cir. 2012).  
 39. Id. 
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court’s medication and commitment orders, emphasizing that the hospital 
staff’s decisions about dangerousness were entitled to deference and 
finding that the administrative procedures followed at Springfield were 
consistent with Harper.
40
 Judge Berzon dissented, on the ground that the 
district court judge could not determine whether commitment was 
necessary to restore Loughner to competency without making an 
independent assessment of whether Loughner could be forcibly medicated 
to achieve that goal.
41
 Turning to the merits, Judge Berzon suggested that 
Loughner might not be sufficiently dangerous to justify forcible 
medication and that, even if he were, the treatment regimen designed to 
achieve that purpose might not restore him to competency or might 
undermine his Sixth Amendment trial rights.
42
  
The Loughner case illustrates several difficulties with Sell’s 
dangerousness exception. Are assaults sufficient evidence of danger to 
others, and are severe bouts of depression or significant sleep or eating 
disorders sufficient evidence of danger to self? In answering those 
questions, does it matter that seclusion, restraints, or anti-anxiety 
medication could reduce the danger, albeit on a temporary basis? The 
prosecution will be tempted to define dangerousness broadly and 
alternatives to medication narrowly in an effort to provide maximum 
protection to its employees and the defendant and, perhaps, also in the 
hope that the medication will restore competency. To avoid the latter 
result, the defense will argue for a narrow definition of dangerousness and 
a generous approach to options other than anti-psychotic drugs. As 
Loughner demonstrates, the fight over dangerousness may well be a proxy 
for the real fight: whether the government can forcibly medicate the 
individual in order to restore competency. Lost in this type of adversarial 
debate will be the psychological welfare of the defendant, who if not 
treated or treated unevenly could de-compensate beyond the point of no 
return.
43
  
 
 
 40. Id. at *16–22. Although the majority opinion can be challenged on a number of grounds, the 
only clearly wrong aspect of the opinion was its holding that Riggins does not apply to pretrial 
determinations of dangerousness. Compare id. at *16 (―when the government seeks to medicate a 
detainee—whether pretrial or post-conviction—on the grounds that he is a danger . . . [t]he Riggins 
standard [requiring consideration of less intrusive alternatives essential for safety] does not govern.‖) 
with supra note 15.  
 41. Loughner, 2012 WL 688805 at *49 (Berzon, J., dissenting). 
 42. Id. at *49–57. 
 43. The longer the duration between the onset of serious psychosis and treatment, the more likely 
long-term disability will result. Max Marshall et al., Association Between Duration of Untreated 
Psychosis and Outcome in Cohorts of “First-Episode” Patients: A Systematic Review, 62 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 975 (2005). Furthermore, quick withdrawal from treatment, sought by the defense 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11
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Thus, a third conundrum arises in connection with this exception, at 
least for defense attorneys. Arguably, the defense has an ethical obligation 
not only to represent its client zealously but also to ensure the 
consequences of its arguments do not seriously harm the client.
44
 The 
claim that advocacy against forcible medication is merely doing the 
client’s bidding rings hollow in those cases where the client may not be 
competent to make treatment decisions (about which more below) or 
where a refusal by a competent defendant is driven by a desire to avoid 
prosecution rather than genuine concern about the effects of anti-psychotic 
medication.
45
  
Defense attorneys worried that the dangerousness exception will be 
used as an end-run around Sell’s prohibition should also consider two 
other points. First, the dangerousness exception, however defined, only 
permits treatment to the extent necessary to address the danger, which is 
not necessarily the same treatment regimen that would bring full 
restoration of competency; for instance, in Loughner the government 
doctors initially prescribed only one milligram of risperidone twice daily, 
well under the usual dose needed to overcome flagrant psychosis.
46
 
Furthermore, even if some semblance of competency does result from 
medication imposed on dangerousness grounds, recall that Riggins 
imposes a serious limitation on any trial that subsequently takes place. The 
court must ensure that the medication does not interfere with the 
defendant’s trial rights, including the ability to follow the trial process, 
communicate with the attorney, and testify.
47
  
It remains unclear whether the dangerousness exception to Sell is a 
significant loophole.
48
 Much depends on how dangerousness is defined, 
 
 
in Loughner, is likely to be more damaging than slow withdrawal. See J. Moncrieff, Does 
Antipsychotic Withdrawal Provoke Psychosis? Review of the Literature on Rapid Onset Psychosis 
(Supersensitivity Psychosis) and Withdrawal-Related Relapse, 114 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA 
SCANDINAVICA 3 (2006). 
 44. The ethical issues raised in this setting are too complicated to address here. Suffice to say that 
the ethical rules do not provide any definitive answers. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 7–12 (1980) (―If the disability of a client and the lack of a legal representative 
compel the lawyer to make decisions for his client, the lawyer should consider all circumstances then 
prevailing and act with care to safeguard and advance the interests of his client.‖). 
 45. Another purely strategic reason for medication refusal in a case like Loughner’s is to provide 
an incentive to the prosecution for abandoning the death penalty.  
 46. Emergency Motion, supra note 33, at 6–7.  
 47. Both first- and second-generation drugs can cause ―mental clouding and sedation coupled to 
a profound loss of motivation which can persist for as long as the treatment continues.‖ RICHARD 
BENTALL, DOCTORING THE MIND: IS OUR CURRENT TREATMENT OF MENTAL ILLNESS REALLY ANY 
GOOD? 229 (2009). 
 48. Of possible relevance here is the Supreme Court’s strong insinuation in Sell that had it heard 
the case de novo it would have found Sell dangerous. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 184–85 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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what alternatives to medication are considered less intrusive means of 
dealing with the danger, and the extent to which the medication 
compromises trial rights. What is clear is that, given its complications, the 
dangerousness exception is not the ―easier‖ alternative ground that Sell 
suggests it is. What also should be clear, but apparently is not to those 
immersed in cases like Loughner’s, is that dangerousness is not the only 
exception to Sell’s admonition against forcible medication.  
B. The Incompetence to Make Treatment Decisions Exception 
After describing Harper’s holding, the Court in Sell stated that courts 
typically justify involuntary treatment relying on ―these alternative, 
Harper-type grounds.‖49 But it went on to describe an alternative ground 
that is significantly different from Harper’s dangerousness exception: 
―Every state provides avenues through which, for example, a doctor or 
institution can seek appointment of a guardian with the power to make a 
decision authorizing medication—when in the best interests of a patient 
who lacks the mental competence to make such a decision.‖50 Although 
this language does not explicitly approve forcible medication in the lack-
of-mental-competence situation, one paragraph later the Court again 
indicated that an individual who is either dangerous or ―[in]competent to 
make up his own mind about treatment‖ may be forcibly medicated.51  
Despite the fact that courts in the medical and civil commitment 
contexts have long recognized that patients who are incompetent to make 
treatment decisions may have the decision made for them,
52
 this second 
exception to the right to refuse is virtually never mentioned by courts 
implementing Sell. Even in Loughner, one of the most intensely litigated 
forcible competency cases since Sell, neither side has addressed the issue, 
nor have the courts. Perhaps that is because the treatment incompetence 
exception was only referenced obliquely in the Sell decision, sandwiched 
within a discussion of ―Harper-type factors,‖ and thus has gone unnoticed. 
 
 
(suggesting that the Court of Appeals had too easily dismissed Sell’s assault on a ward nurse and 
noting that the court did not explain how it arrived at its conclusion that Sell was not dangerous, given 
the fact ―that the testifying psychiatrists concluded that Sell was dangerous, while Sell’s own expert 
denied, not Sell’s dangerousness, but the efficacy of the drugs proposed for treatment.‖).  
 49. Id. at 182. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 183. 
 52. Even courts that have taken a strong stance in favor of the right to refuse recognize an 
exception when the ―patient is incompetent to make a treatment decision.‖ Rogers v. Comm’r of Dep’t 
of Mental Health, 458 N.E.2d 308, 322 (Mass. 1983).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11
  
 
 
 
 
2012] SELL’S CONUNDRUMS 1533 
 
 
 
 
Or perhaps this aspect of Sell has received little consideration because, for 
reasons developed below, it comes close to rendering Sell irrelevant.  
Two issues arise in connection with the treatment incompetence 
rationale for forcible medication. The first, the definition of incompetence 
to make a treatment decision, has received extensive attention in the 
literature.
53
 My own view is that people are incompetent in this sense if: 
(1) they are unable to understand the risks and benefits of the treatment; 
(2) give delusional reasons for refusing it (e.g., ―If I take the drugs the 
world will end,‖ or ―If I undergo this treatment I’ll become pregnant.‖); or 
(3) fail to consider reasons at all (usually as a result of severe 
depression).
54
 Others have defined treatment incompetency more broadly, 
to include any evidence of significant pathology or an inability to 
manipulate the relevant risk-benefit information ―rationally.‖55  
If either of the last two tests (the significant pathology or inability-to-
manipulate test) is adopted, then almost by definition defendants who are 
found incompetent to stand trial are also incompetent to make treatment 
decisions. The accepted standard for competency to proceed with trial 
comes from Dusky v. United States,
56
 which held that a defendant is 
incompetent in this sense if he lacks ―sufficient present ability to consult 
with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and 
whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of proceedings 
against him.‖57 This is not an easy test to meet.58 Defendants like 
Loughner who are found incompetent under Dusky are significantly 
impaired. They will certainly be experiencing pathological symptoms and 
difficulty rationally thinking about the risk and benefits of medication. 
Even under the narrower definition I prefer (noted above), many 
 
 
 53. See, e.g., ELYN SAKS, REFUSING CARE: FORCED TREATMENT AND THE RIGHTS OF THE 
MENTALLY ILL (2002); Thomas Grisso & Paul Appelbaum, Abilities of Patients to Consent to 
Psychiatric and Medical Treatments, 19 L. & HUM BEHAV. 149 (1995) (discussing different 
definitions of competency and reporting a study indicating that regardless of the test used, 
approximately 25% of the subjects with schizophrenia scored in the ―impaired‖ range, compared with 
5% of medical patients and 2% of non-treated individuals in the community).  
 54. CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, MINDING JUSTICE: LAWS THAT DEPRIVE PEOPLE WITH MENTAL 
DISABILITY OF LIFE AND LIBERTY 233–35 (2006) (developing and defending the basic rationality and 
basic self-regard test for treatment competency). 
 55. See, e.g., Loren Roth et al., Tests of Competency to Consent to Treatment, 134 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 279, 283 (1977) (suggesting that the latter tests might be ―legitimate‖ when there is 
―favorable risk benefit ratio to the proposed treatment,‖ which most psychiatrists probably feel is the 
case with antipsychotic medication).  
 56. 362 U.S. 402 (1960). 
 57. Id. at 402 (internal quotations omitted). 
 58. See RONALD ROESCH & STEPHEN GOLDING, COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL 48–49 (1980) 
(finding that, on average only about 30 percent of defendants who are referred for competency 
evaluations are found incompetent). 
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defendants found incompetent to proceed will be incompetent to make 
treatment decisions; in particular, if they do not meet prong (1) above 
because they cannot understand the risks and benefits of going to trial, 
pleading guilty, and waiving rights, they will probably not be able to 
understand the risks and benefits of treatment. Thus, on the surface at 
least, this exception to the right to refuse announced in Sell pretty much 
swallows the right.
59
  
Competency to proceed with trial and competency to make treatment 
decisions are not entirely congruent, however. Some defendants may not 
understand the nature or consequences of the trial process but understand 
the risks and benefits of treatment.
60
 Some defendants may be found 
incompetent to proceed not because they lack understanding of relevant 
facts about the criminal process but because they express delusional 
reasoning about the trial process, while at the same time remaining able to 
give non-delusional reasons for refusing treatment. Thus, depending on 
how competency to make treatment decisions is defined, the Venn 
diagram depicting incompetency to proceed and incompetency to make 
treatment decisions leaves at least some independent, if tiny, spaces on 
each edge.  
Moreover, even a person who is incompetent to make treatment 
decisions is not automatically subject to medication. As Sell indicated, a 
guardian or some other decision maker must additionally determine that 
the medication is in the individual’s ―best interests.‖61 This second issue 
connected with the incompetency exception is also a complicated one. 
Medication may not be in the person’s best interests because of its side 
effects or its inefficacy at treating mental illness. Where, as here, criminal 
defendants are involved, a guardian might even include within the best-
interests calculus the fact that treatment could lead to trial and conviction 
(although a good argument can be made that the latter possibility is 
irrelevant in this situation
62
).  
 
 
 59. I made this point in SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 230. For fuller development of the 
argument, see Robert Schopp, Involuntary Treatment and Competence to Proceed in the Criminal 
Process: Capital and Noncapital Cases, 24 BEH. SCI. & L. 495, 502–10 (2006).  
 60. See NORMAN G. POYTHRESS ET AL., ADJUDICATIVE COMPETENCE: THE MACARTHUR 
STUDIES 108 (2002) (reporting empirical research on competence to stand trial that led the researchers 
to conclude that ―impairment with respect to one legal issue is likely to be a poor proxy for impairment 
in another.‖). 
 61. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003).  
 62. Cf. Schopp, supra note 59, at 517 (―the determination that the involuntarily administered 
medication is, or is not, in the offender’s medical interests . . . does not include the anticipated 
execution because the evaluation of the legitimacy of his capital sentence falls within the authority of 
the [courts].‖). 
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At the same time, the best-interests standard applied in this setting is 
not simply a determination of whether medication will prevent suicide or 
other serious harm to self, a formulation that would collapse this exception 
into the dangerousness exception. One could justifiably conclude that 
medication is in the best interests of an individual even if the person is not 
suicidal or in grave danger or deterioration, as long as the treatment 
improves his or her mental health.
63
 And if medication is considered the 
best way of restoring a criminal defendant to treatment competency and 
mental health, then the fact that the defendant’s competence to proceed 
might also be restored by the treatment should be irrelevant, even after 
Sell. In short, if this exception is taken seriously, most criminal defendants 
found incompetent to proceed do not have a right to refuse medication, 
even though that medication may well have the effect of restoring them to 
Dusky competence.  
The conundrums raised by this exception are still not exhausted, 
however. What if the defendant is forcibly medicated under this exception 
and, once restored to treatment competency, decides to refuse medication? 
Does the defendant have a right to do so? If he or she is dangerous (see 
Exception One), presumably not. But what if dangerousness cannot be 
shown? This last question leads to the third exception.  
C. The Serious Crime Exception 
Sell stated that the involuntary administration of drugs to restore trial 
competence can occur if ―important governmental interests are at stake,‖ 
which it indicated included the interest in prosecuting ―serious crimes‖ 
against person or property.
64
 That statement would seem to open the door 
wide to forcible competency restoration in most serious felony cases. The 
lower courts have used a variety of indicia for figuring out when a crime is 
serious for purposes of Sell,
65
 but all appear to agree that homicide and 
 
 
 63. Consider, for instance, this definition of acting in a patient’s ―best interests‖: ―[P]romoting 
personal well-being by the assessment of the risks, benefits and alternatives to the patient of a 
proposed major medical treatment taking into account factors including the relief of suffering, the 
preservation or restoration of functioning, improvement in the quality of the patient’s life with and 
without the proposed major medical treatment and consistency with personal beliefs and values known 
to be held by the patient.‖ In re Beth Israel Medical Center, 136 Misc. 2d 931, 938–39, 519 N.Y.S.2d 
511, 516 (Sup. Ct. 1987) (quoting N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 80.03(d) (McKinney 1988)). 
 64. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180 (emphasis in original). 
 65. See, e.g., United States v. Hernandez-Vasques, 513 F.3d 908, 918–19 (9th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that the guidelines ―are the best available predictor of the length of a defendant’s incarceration‖); 
United States v. Valenzuela-Puentes, 479 F.2d 1220, 1225 (10th Cir. 2007) (six to eight year 
maximum guidelines sentence for illegally entering the United States sufficiently serious, given 
defendant’s long criminal history); United States v. Evans, 404 F.3d 227, 237–38 (4th Cir. 2005) 
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attempted homicide, as well as rape, armed robbery, and aggravated 
assault fit the bill.
66
 
Thus, even if the previous two exceptions do not apply to Jared 
Loughner, the serious crime exception would seem to provide obvious 
authority to medicate him over his objection, even if the sole purpose is to 
restore him to trial competency. However, Sell proceeded to muddy the 
water in this situation by indicating that the government’s interest in 
prosecuting serious cases might be lessened by ―special circumstances.‖67 
Specifically, the Court stated, ―[t]he defendant’s failure to take drugs 
voluntarily, for example, may mean lengthy confinement in an institution 
for the mentally ill—and that would diminish the risks that ordinarily 
attach to freeing without punishment one who has committed a serious 
crime.‖68 The Court hastened to add that, by this statement, ―[w]e do not 
mean to suggest that civil commitment is a substitute for a criminal 
trial.‖69 But the Court’s language contemplating ―lengthy confinement in 
an institution for the mentally ill‖ is hard to read any other way, and lower 
courts have certainly done so.
70
 
The Court’s ―special circumstances‖ caveat to the serious crimes 
exception is incoherent for two reasons. First, civil commitment does not 
come close to achieving the government’s aims in serious criminal cases. 
As the Weston court stated, this argument 
assumes that the government’s essential penological interests lie 
only in incapacitating dangerous offenders. It ignores the 
retributive, deterrent, communicative, and investigative functions of 
the criminal justice system, which serve to ensure that offenders 
receive their just deserts, to make clear that offenses entail 
consequences, and to discover what happened through the public 
mechanism of trial.
71
 
 
 
(holding that the statutory maximum rather than the sentencing guidelines maximum is the appropriate 
benchmark because it determines the right to jury trial and because guidelines sentences cannot be 
predicted); United States v. Dumeny, 295 F. Supp. 2d 131, 132 (D. Me. 2004) (maximum ten-year 
sentence for possession of a firearm by person previously committed to a mental health institute not 
sufficiently serious). 
 66. See Cruz, supra note 6, at 399. 
 67. Sell, 539 U.S. at 180.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id.  
 70. See, e.g., United States v. Grape, 549 F.3d 591, 601–03 (3d Cir. 2008) (addressing Grape’s 
argument that civil commitment would accomplish the government’s aims by concluding that ―[i]t is 
no longer clear that Grape’s punishment-incarceration, whether in prison or a medical facility, would 
be the same whether or not he were involuntary medicated.‖). 
 71. United States v. Weston, 255 F.3d 873, 882 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
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Second, even if civil commitment did manage to achieve the 
prosecution’s objectives, it is not available in this situation, because civil 
commitment requires proof of dangerousness to self or others.
72
 If such 
proof is forthcoming then forcible medication is permissible under Sell’s 
dangerousness exception. If the dangerousness exception does not apply, 
commitment should not be possible either.  
Yet the Court’s insinuation to the contrary was not an accident. 
Consider how the Court applied its holding to Charles Sell. After 
assuming that Sell was not dangerous, the majority chastised the lower 
courts for failing to include in their analysis not only the time Sell had 
already been incapacitated but the fact that ―his refusal to take 
antipsychotic drugs might result in further lengthy confinement.‖73 The 
Court was apparently oblivious to the fact that this part of Sell is a direct 
contradiction of its holding thirty years earlier in O’Connor v. 
Donaldson
74
 that ―there is . . . no constitutional basis for confining [people 
with mental illness] involuntarily if they are dangerous to no one and can 
live safely in freedom.‖75 Under Donaldson, if Sell was not dangerous to 
self or others, as the Court assumed, then the state had no grounds to hold 
him.  
In short, a strong argument can be made that the Court either should 
have avoided creating a serious crime exception (on the ground that the 
government’s interest in prosecution can never trump the right to refuse), 
or it should have adopted the exception sans its caveat creating a new type 
of commitment. But as the next part explains, creation of the commitment 
option might have been necessary once the Court decided to allow 
competent, non-dangerous defendants to refuse medication. This 
dispositional conundrum may be the most mystifying of the lot.  
III. DISPOSITION OF LEGITIMATE REFUSERS 
Up to this point, the analysis of Sell has suggested that most criminal 
defendants found incompetent to proceed will not be able to refuse 
medically appropriate anti-psychotic medication that is necessary to 
restore trial competency. Either they will be charged with a serious crime 
and not be committable (the baby bear exception), or they will be 
 
 
 72. See GARY MELTON ET AL., PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK 
FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS 335 (3d ed. 2007) (stating that ―[e]ach state also 
requires a finding that the individual is dangerous to self or others as a result of the mental disorder.‖).  
 73. Sell, 539 U.S. at 185 (―We must assume that Sell is not dangerous.‖). 
 74. 422 U.S. 563 (1975). 
 75. Id. at 575. 
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dangerous to self or others (the mama bear exception) or, most likely of 
all, they will be incompetent to make treatment decisions (the papa bear 
exception), and sometimes they will meet more than one exception. 
Furthermore, even involuntary medication solely for the purpose of 
restoring defendants to competency should be relatively common (in other 
words, should be permissible in all cases involving serious crime) if one 
agrees with the foregoing conclusion that commitment is not a legitimate 
alternative to prosecution in such cases. 
However, as the previous part explained, the Court apparently does not 
agree with that analysis. Furthermore, even if a defendant is medicated 
under the dangerousness or incompetency exceptions and responds well to 
the medication, trial competence restoration may not result, given the 
differing treatment goals involved. Finally, even if one or more of the 
exceptions are met and competency is restorable, the Riggins criteria—
medical appropriateness, efficacy, and necessity—may not be met. In all 
of these situations, refusal of anti-psychotic medication is permitted. And 
while some of these defendants may become competent to stand trial 
through means other than medication, many will not.
76
  
The issue for all of these individuals then becomes disposition. 
Prosecution is not possible, at least under current law.
77
 Thus, the relevant 
rule would seem to be stated by Jackson v. Indiana,
78
 which held that 
defendants who are not restorable to competency must be either civilly 
committed or released. Many of the individuals who are permitted to 
refuse solely because the Riggins criteria are not met may be committable, 
and the few who are not restored despite meeting the dangerousness 
exception will be as well. But the small number of individuals who are 
 
 
 76. Cognitive-behavioral therapy can benefit patients who are at risk for psychosis, patients who 
are drug-resistant, and patients who are also receiving medication. See, e.g., Nicholas Tarrier et al., 
Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy in First-Episode and Early Schizophrenia: 18-Month Follow-up of a 
Randomised Controlled Trial, 184 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 231 (2004); Anthony P. Morrison et al., 
Cognitive Therapy for the Prevention of Psychosis in People at Ultra-High Risk: A Randomised 
Controlled Trial, 185 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 291 (2004); Elizabeth A. Kuipers et al., London-East 
Anglia Randomised Controlled Trial of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy for Psychosis III: Follow-up 
and Economic Evaluations at 18 Months, 173 BRIT. J. PSYCHIATRY 61 (1998). However, people who 
are already psychotic and not drug-resistant, the group in question here, are probably not likely to 
improve significantly with psychotherapy alone. See Gerald L. Klerman, The Psychiatric Patient’s 
Right to Effective Treatment: Implications of Osheroff v. Chestnut Lodge, 147 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 409 
(1990). 
 77. One possible reform, yet to be adopted in any jurisdiction, is to permit trial of the 
unrestorably incompetent individual who, if convicted, would be committed to a mental hospital under 
the criteria applied to insanity acquittees. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-4.13 
(1984). 
 78. 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972). 
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left—consisting of those who are properly treatable with medication but 
are allowed to refuse it because they are not dangerous, are competent to 
make treatment decisions, and can argue their right to refuse outweighs the 
government’s interest in prosecution—will not be committable under 
traditional commitment criteria. If Jackson applies, these people—call 
them Jackson-eligible defendants—should be released. 
Release probably makes sense for those Jackson-eligible defendants 
who are not charged with a serious crime. Many of these defendants 
should probably be diverted out of the criminal justice system in any 
event.
79
 But release of individuals who are charged with a serious crime—
here meaning any felony—may strike some as inappropriate, since the 
reason these defendants are not restorable is because of their refusal to 
take medication despite its medical appropriateness.
80
 Furthermore, this 
refusal is presumably fully ―knowing;‖ if these defendants were 
incompetent to make treatment decisions, they would have been forcibly 
medicated under the treatment incompetency exception.  
Perhaps, as Sell suggests, Jackson should not apply to this latter 
category of competent, non-dangerous people. In the end, the choice will 
have to be made between, on the one hand, providing these people with 
the ability to game the system and, on the other, distorting commitment 
criteria so they will be deterred from doing so (the Court’s ―special 
circumstances‖?). The only good news about this choice is that it will not 
have to occur very often, at least if all three exceptions discussed here are 
recognized. 
IV. PROCEDURES 
Sell raises numerous tough issues having to do with dangerousness, 
treatment incompetence, crime seriousness, and the effects of medication. 
In the prison context, Harper held that an administrative panel—
consisting entirely of in-house employees, albeit employees who are 
―independent‖ of the treatment team—could make the initial decisions 
 
 
 79. This goal is arguably the whole point of mental health courts, which have proliferated 
recently. See, e.g., Mental Health Courts Program, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.bja.gov/Program 
Details.aspx?Program_ID=68 (last visited Apr. 15, 2012) (―The goal of BJA’s Mental Health Court 
grant program is to decrease the frequency of clients’ contacts with the criminal justice system by 
providing courts with resources to improve clients’ social functioning and link them to employment, 
housing, treatment, and support services.‖). 
 80. Certainly Jackson’s commit-or-release rule for unrestorably incompetent defendants has met 
more than a little resistance. See Grant H. Morris & J. Reid Meloy, Out of Mind? Out of Sight: The 
Uncivil Commitment of Permanently Incompetent Criminal Defendants, 27 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 77–
78 (1993) (as of 1993 a majority of jurisdictions ignore or circumvent Jackson). 
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about dangerousness and medication effects.
81
 In Loughner, however, the 
defense was successful on two different occasions in obtaining an 
injunction, pending a court hearing, challenging administrative decisions 
about treatment, principally on the ground that Loughner involved the pre-
trial context rather than Harper’s post-conviction setting.82 In the March, 
2012 three-judge decision in the Loughner case two of the judges, Bybee 
and Berzon, even signaled a willingness to require some sort of legal 
representation at these administrative hearings.
83
 Further, as already noted, 
Berzon was insistent that re-commitment decisions that are contingent on 
whether forcible medication may occur require judicial review of any issue 
related to medication.
84
 
Sell did not address the procedural issues directly. However, in its 
discussion of why the dangerousness issue might be ―more objective and 
manageable‖ than the competence restoration issue, the Court stated that  
[M]edical experts may find it easier to provide an informed opinion 
about whether, given the risk of side effects, particular drugs are 
medically appropriate and necessary to control a patient’s 
potentially dangerous behavior (or to avoid serious harm to the 
patient himself) than to try to balance harms and benefits related to 
the more quintessentially legal questions of trial fairness and 
competence.
85
  
This language resonates with Court language in other cases such as 
Parham v. J. R.
86
 and Vitek v. Jones,
87
 which approved relaxed procedural 
protections in treatment hearings. Court proceedings are expensive, are 
antithetical to the quick decision making often needed in treatment 
settings, and divert experts from their treatment chores.
88
 Furthermore, a 
 
 
 81. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 234–35 (1990). 
 82. See supra text accompanying notes 25–37. 
 83. United States v. Loughner, Nos. 11-10339, 11-10504, 11-10432, 2012 WL 688805, at *25–
29 n.6 (9th Cir. 2012) (Bybee, J.); Id. at *62–63 (Berzon, J.). 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 41. 
 85. Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 182 (2003). 
 86. 442 U.S. 584, 609 (1979) (upholding a process in which hospital staff presided over juvenile 
commitment, stating that ―[c]ommon human experience and scholarly opinions suggest that the 
supposed protections of an adversary proceeding to determine the appropriateness of medical decisions 
for the commitment and treatment of mental and emotional illness may well be more illusory than 
real.‖).  
 87. 445 U.S. 480, 496 (1980) (upholding a process in which hospital or prison staff approved a 
prison-to-hospital transfer).  
 88. See Alexander D. Brooks, The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication: Law and Policy, 39 
RUTGERS L. REV. 339 (1987) (detailing costs of judicial proceedings to the patient, the staff and the 
state).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/11
  
 
 
 
 
2012] SELL’S CONUNDRUMS 1541 
 
 
 
 
defendant’s dangerousness and competence can be very volatile.89 
Invoking a judicially supervised adversarial process every time a 
defendant’s mental state fluctuates would be, at the least, highly inefficient 
and in some situations probably impossible. 
The best argument for nonetheless involving a court in some way at the 
initial decision making stage is that, as the foregoing discussion suggested, 
Sell has created significant incentives for both the government officials 
and defense attorneys to manipulate the system. In other work I have put 
this point as follows: 
[T]he decision [in Sell] creates an incentive for virtually all the 
players in the criminal process to act pretextually. . . [P]rosecutors 
may be prone to overcharge to make the government’s interest more 
―important.‖ Clinicians working at forensic facilities will be asked 
to treat ―dangerousness‖ but will know the real purpose of the 
referral is to restore competency (and in those cases where the 
treatment modalities might differ depending on whether reduction 
in danger or restoration of competency is the goal, clinicians will be 
pressured to pursue both). Defense attorneys might be more likely 
to raise the competency issue even when competency is not in 
doubt, because a finding of incompetency and treatment refusal can 
lead to dismissal of charges. For the same reason, defendants will be 
tempted to refuse medication, even when they are not concerned 
about side effects, simply as a means of evading prosecution. In 
other words, everyone involved in criminal prosecution of a person 
who has been found incompetent will pretend restoration of 
competence is not the issue, when in fact it is the only issue.
90
  
A judge, with the benefit of a full adversarial hearing, will be better able to 
sniff out hidden agendas than hospital employees who, unconsciously or 
not, may be involved in the manipulation of the rules.   
A compromise procedural framework might reconcile these two 
positions by fitting the decision maker to the decision to be made. The 
prosecution should have to state at the time a defendant is found 
incompetent whether it wants to invoke the serious crime exception. If it 
 
 
 89. Paul S. Appelbaum & Loren H. Roth, Clinical Issues in the Assessment of Competency, 138 
AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1462, 1464 (1981) (―Like the patient’s mental status as a whole, a patient’s 
competency may fluctuate as a function of the natural course of his or her illness, response to 
treatment, psychodynamic factors, . . . metabolic status, intercurrent illnesses, or the effect of 
medications.‖). 
 90. SLOBOGIN, supra note 54, at 229. 
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does, the court should decide whether the charge is in fact serious and 
whether the ―special circumstances‖ caveat applies. Both of these are 
―quintessentially legal‖ issues. If the prosecution wins this argument and 
the defendant later refuses treatment the court then need only determine 
whether the Riggins criteria are met, a determination that will rely heavily 
on expert testimony. If the government is unable to convince the court that 
the serious crime exception governs and the defendant later refuses, an 
administrative panel should make the initial decision as to whether the 
dangerousness or incompetence exception applies, since these issues 
involve a mixture of clinical and legal issues and can be time-sensitive. 
However, as the policy upheld in Harper provided, these decisions would 
be subject to appeal to a court. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Sell raises many more questions than it answers. As the Loughner case 
illustrates, it also vastly increases the potential for the adversarial system 
simultaneously to harm the interests of both the defendant and society. 
The opinion is to be commended for reaffirming and emphasizing the 
Riggins requirements of medical appropriateness, efficacy and necessity. 
The drugs used to treat psychosis—including the so-called second-
generation atypicals—all can have serious side effects, are frequently 
administered in unnecessarily large doses or are not good drugs for the 
particular person being treated, and are ineffective for anywhere from a 
quarter to a third of those to whom they are administered.
91
 In such cases, 
forcible medication (and perhaps even consensual medication) should not 
be permitted. But Sell goes beyond this clinically-beneficent restriction to 
suggest that even those who are safely restorable to competency through 
properly titrated medication have a right to refuse treatment aimed at 
achieving that goal, unless their crime is serious and prosecution is 
necessary to assure they are confined. Furthermore, to avoid the systemic 
impact of this holding, Sell tempts lower courts to implement a 
problematic dangerousness exception, while virtually ignoring the 
conceptually stronger but potentially rule-swallowing treatment-
incompetency exception.  
A much better approach—conceptually and practically—would be to 
enforce the Riggins criteria strictly, but to permit forcible medication to 
restore competency if those criteria are met, at least when felony charges 
 
 
 91. A good summary of the research supporting these points is found in BENTALL, supra note 47, 
at 222–24. 
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are involved. Under this approach, the conundrums embedded in the 
dangerousness, treatment incompetency, and serious crime exceptions 
would disappear, because they would no longer be relevant. Courts could 
then concentrate on ensuring that treatment efforts are directed at safely 
restoring defendants to a state where they can be fairly tried on their 
charges.
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